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Introduction 
 
 
The Battle for Benghazi 
The Limits of Stabilization by Military Means 
Nizar Sarieldin 
After being on the sidelines of the transition process for more than two years, Benghazi 
has been turned into a major battlefield over the past nine months for the competing 
parties in Libya. Yet, even a victory by the forces fighting on behalf of the government 
of Tobruk over Islamist forces backed by the rival administration in Tripoli is unlikely 
to stabilize the situation in eastern Libya, let alone solve the deep crisis that has all but 
ended the political process since summer 2014. Rather, it is liable to lead to increasing 
competition – and perhaps violent conflict – among the different elements of the fragile 
coalition now backing the Tobruk government as well as intensify momentum leading 
toward the breakup of Libya as a unitary state. The fight for Benghazi therefore illus-
trates the limits of stabilization by military means. Germany and its European partners 
should support a unity government, which the current talks in Geneva are aimed at. 
They should also desist from contributing to a further escalation by supporting actors 
who push for military solutions. 
 
In the fall of 2014, forces of the so-called 
Libyan National Army (LNA), under the 
command of General Khalifa Haftar, suc-
ceeded in pushing Islamist and jihadist 
forces out of much of Benghazi – Libya’s 
second city and the main urban hub of the 
eastern region. Although the conflict there 
is currently at a stalemate, it appears likely 
that Haftar’s forces, which are nominally 
acting on behalf of the internationally 
recognized Libyan government of Tobruk 
(but are actually based in Bayda), will be 
able to consolidate their hold over the city. 
Some factions in the Bayda government are 
already pushing to extend the campaign 
and launch an assault on the Islamist strong-
hold of Darna, located halfway between the 
two eastern cities. At the same time, the con-
flict has driven Islamists in the east into 
an ever-closer alliance with the rival govern-
ment in Tripoli, which is liable to lead to a 
further radicalization of the leadership in 
the country’s capital. After being on the side-
lines of Libyan politics for the first two years 
of the transformation process, Benghazi has 
thus been turned into a battleground mirror-
ing the larger confrontation in the country. 
Roots of the Struggle 
Since the end of 2011, Benghazi has suffered 
from a political vacuum and a deteriorating 
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security situation. The persistent failure of 
Libya’s new rulers to reestablish military 
or police forces capable of reinforcing state 
control has undermined the authority of 
successive governments. Instead, new politi-
cal bodies such as the National Transitional 
Council (NTC) and the General National 
Congress (GNC) and its successive govern-
ments have only aggravated the situation 
by choosing to invest in a multitude of 
armed non-state actors with different – 
and often contradictory – mandates. 
Indeed, already at the start of 2012, the 
city had witnessed large-scale attacks by 
various militias on state security forces’ 
facilities, army sites, and on foreign diplo-
matic missions, which eventually resulted 
in the evacuation of all foreign representa-
tions. The violence and lawlessness have 
been attributed to groups seeking to lever-
age their role in the revolution for political 
or financial advantage. By the end of the 
2011 civil war, many of the city’s militias 
had taken over – at times by force – the 
former regime’s arms stocks and appropri-
ated its military bases, using them partly 
as a prison and as investigation offices. For 
example, the Zintan Martyrs Brigade took 
over a camp of the Air Force unit in the 
city. They then pressured the government 
to authorize these takeovers. 
In reaction, the first post-revolutionary 
government under interim Prime Minister 
Abdurrahim El-Keib (in office from Novem-
ber 2011 to November 2012) approved the 
creation of two new security forces from 
the ranks of the militias, among them the 
two major Islamist and jihadist ones. First, 
on 22 February 2012, the Supreme Security 
Committee was established. Acting under 
the Interior Ministry, it was given a one-
year mandate to establish security in the 
city. Second, on 8 August 2012 came the 
formation of the Libya Shield Forces (LSF), 
which was to be an interim force aimed at 
integrating the rebels into the army, acting 
under the Defense Ministry. Yet, many saw 
these new formations as an attempt by 
the revolutionary and Islamist militias to 
replace the police and army. With this, 
not only were these two militias allowed 
to remain in Benghazi, they were also sanc-
tioned to operate on behalf of the state. 
These decrees ignited the conflict between 
revolutionary and Islamist militias on the 
one side and remnants of the former Libyan 
Army on the other. In September 2012, 
following the attack on the US diplomatic 
compound in Benghazi by Islamist militias, 
which resulted in the killing of US Ambas-
sador Christopher Stevens, citizens called 
for a popular uprising against the militias 
in the city, and for the dissolution of any 
armed force that would not integrate into 
the country’s army. The results were bloody 
clashes, with 11 people killed on both sides, 
marking a decisive turning point in Bengha-
zi’s internal dynamics. The militias, once 
popular and respected for their fight against 
the Qaddafi regime, came to be seen as a 
threat to the city’s future. 
In parallel, a series of assassinations 
targeted ex-Qaddafi army figures, which 
seemed to be a recurrence of the killing of 
General Abd al-Fattah Younis in July 2011, 
the chief of staff of the NTC, which was the 
de facto government during the 2011 up-
rising. The assassination campaign acceler-
ated at a steady pace during 2012 and 2013 
and reached a peak of some 50 people – 
from military figures to activists and ordi-
nary citizens – every month in early 2014. 
Benghazi scored the highest number of 
violent deaths in all of Libya (in 2014: 1,471, 
out of a country tally of 2,825), although 
no suspects were identified or arrested. 
Judiciary institutions were also attacked, 
causing the courts to suspend work. 
Indeed, it seems that the targeting of the 
judiciary was aimed at paralyzing the state 
institutions and later replacing them with 
Sharia courts. Even though there is no defi-
nite evidence that Islamists were behind 
the violence, many observers have sug-
gested that these assassinations have been 
driven by revenge, or with the aim of estab-
lishing parallel army and police forces and 
then replacing the state institutions might 
have been the real motive. Violence against 
the security apparatus can also be under-
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stood against the background of the history 
of hostility between Islamists and army of-
ficers, which dates back to the 1990s, when 
the Qaddafi regime used the army to mete 
out brutal repression against the Islamists. 
Hence, the rising hostility toward the 
Islamist and revolutionary militias among 
the population, the absence of an effective 
state security apparatus, and the rise in the 
levels of violence and clashes all prepared 
the ground for “Operation Dignity” (Kara-
ma), launched by General Haftar in May 
2014, with the declared intention of waging 
“war on terrorism” in Benghazi and restor-
ing security to the city. 
Misrata-Islamists Alliance 
Haftar’s offensive occurred at a point in 
time when the political transition in Libya 
was already on the verge of breaking down. 
While an alliance formed between powerful 
militias based in Libya’s third largest city 
(Misrata) and the Muslim Brotherhood (MB)-
affiliated Justice and Construction party – 
which insisted that the tenure of the GNC 
and the government, which it dominated, 
would not end in February 2014, as claimed 
by the National Forces Alliance (NFA) – the 
latter pushed for immediate elections and 
began drawing massive levels of popular 
support, in particular in Tripoli. 
With the onset of the Karama campaign, 
an increasing number of army units de-
clared loyalty to Haftar. The Al-Qaqaa and 
Al-Sawa’iq militias from Zintan – foes of 
the Misrata militias – issued an ultimatum, 
giving GNC members five hours to evacuate 
the premises, tender their resignations, and 
transfer authority to the Supreme Court. The 
Islamists regarded such steps as an attempt 
to stage what they called “the Egyptian 
scenario” in Libya, i.e., a coup. The Misrata-
led alliance saw its hitherto clear military 
superiority increasingly challenged and 
finally agreed to hold elections for a new 
House of Representatives (HoR) at the end of 
June 2014. Yet, after suffering a defeat in 
the elections, they launched their own mili-
tary operation under the title “Libya Dawn” 
and took control of the capital, which forced 
the newly elected HoR to flee for the safety 
of Tobruk near the Egyptian border. 
In Benghazi, the immediate result of 
Haftar’s assault was that revolutionary and 
Islamist militias set their differences aside 
and united under the umbrella of the Ben-
ghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council (BRSC). 
This council later fragmented into three 
groups, which, however, upheld their strong 
coordination within the BRSC. Further-
more, as the crisis on the national level 
escalated, the Misrata-led alliance came to 
see the BRSC as a useful ally that would 
tie down its opponents’ forces, which may 
have otherwise impeded its own move to 
consolidate military control over the capital. 
It therefore provided funding and arms to 
the Benghazi factions. With joined forces 
and Misrata’s backing, the BRSC initially 
succeeded in repelling the attack and driv-
ing Haftar’s forces out of most of the city 
by the end of July. Yet, in October 2014, a 
second offensive by Haftar – now supported 
by groups of fighters recruited from the 
local population – succeeded in dislodging 
the BRSC from much of the city. 
Benghazi Dynamics 
Thus far, the conflict in Benghazi has been 
a complex power struggle over legitimacy 
of representation. It has manifested itself 
in two main camps, with a variety of diverg-
ing interests among the different players of 
these camps. Although neither of the two 
camps rejects Sharia rule, the anti-Islamist 
camp would give a subordinate role to reli-
gious authorities in what they call a civil 
state. Yet, within the Karama coalition, 
there are divergencies with regard to a fed-
eral vs. a unitary state in Libya. 
Tribal orientations have not played a 
major role in this to date. However, the 
propaganda of both sides has attempted to 
exploit tribal dynamics to whip up support. 
In reality, neither commanders nor fighters 
on either side are exclusively affiliated 
to specific tribal groups, but rather are 
recruited from a diverse range of the city’s 
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tribes. The city is a hodgepodge of tribal 
groups, with almost half the tribes being 
of western origins and the rest stemming 
from Bedouin tribes from the east. However, 
historically, families of Misratan origin 
have dominated trade and business in the 
city. Also, those families that have left the 
city fled due to their political orientations 
rather than tribal territorial logic. Support-
ers of the Islamists and revolutionaries 
leave areas controlled by Haftar for Misrata 
and Tripoli, whereas those who move away 
from areas ruled by the Islamists take refuge 
in the eastern coastal cities controlled by 
Haftar’s allies. 
Yet, media based in Misrata or sympa-
thetic to the political positions of its leader-
ship have highlighted reports of attacks 
against Misratan families affiliated with 
Islamists and the revolutionary camp. 
Haftar’s propaganda, mainly carried by the 
federalists, in turn has been emphasizing 
the Misratan roots of Islamist fighters and 
the businessmen supporting them, and 
has therefore called on Misratans to leave 
Benghazi and the eastern region. Thus, 
both sides have stressed the tribal compo-
nent in the struggle. A prolonged conflict 
in Benghazi is therefore certain to deepen 
regional and tribal divisions between the 
east and the west of Libya. This plays into 
the hands of those pushing for a federaliza-
tion of the country, or even its breakup into 
two or more sovereign units – a trend that 
is liable to hasten the spiral of violence. 
Most importantly, the violence against 
families and individuals that has been car-
ried out by both rival forces has already led 
to further polarization. It is set to increase 
the rifts in Benghazi’s social fabric and 
radicalize society – leaving little chance for 
stabilization. 
Revolutionary and Islamist Forces 
Haftar’s anti-Islamist campaign in Benghazi 
urged the eight major militias in the city 
to set aside their ideological differences and 
political rivalries and to combine their fire-
power into a single coalition, the BRSC, estab-
lished on 20 June 2014. In essence, there are 
three different groups in the anti-Haftar 
camp: the Islamic-leaning, the jihadist, and 
revolutionaries with mixed ideological 
leanings. 
Besides Ansar al-Sharia (AS), the backbone 
of the Islamist and revolutionary forces in 
Benghazi is made up of LSF 1, 2, and 7. The 
LSF were set up as a temporary vehicle for 
integrating former rebel fighters into a co-
hesive national force, but it has clashed with 
other government-sponsored forces, such as 
Saiqa, the Special Forces unit of the Libyan 
Army, over control. By the end of 2013, the 
LSF had fragmented again into its compo-
nents. In general, the alliance is hobbled by 
a chaotic chain of command and the absence 
of well-funded structures. Its strength stems 
mainly from its ideological zeal as well as 
the combat experience and strategic capabil-
ities that many of its fighters gained during 
the conflicts in Mali and Syria. 
AS, whose real stronghold is in the town 
of Darna, some 300 km to the east of Bengha-
zi, is explicitly cooperating with the LSF 
and seeking to use the LSF’s military weight 
to establish an Islamic state in Benghazi. It 
is also using the BRSC as a front, since many 
residents of Benghazi reject AS due to its 
ideological orientation and the declared 
opposition of its former leader Mohamed 
al-Zahawi to a democratic state, security in-
stitutions, and the political process as such. 
Although the BRSC groups are united 
in their goal to prevent Haftar from taking 
over the city, there are clear differences in 
the tactics they apply. AS and other jihadis, 
such as the Majlis Shura Shabab al-Islam, 
which has declared its allegiance to the 
Islamic State leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, 
have espoused suicide bombings, car bombs, 
and the beheading of opponents, whereas 
other militias have followed more conven-
tional tactics of guerrilla combat. 
The war in Benghazi has resulted in the 
radicalization of formerly non-ideological 
groups. This is clearly what happened with 
Wissam Bin Hamid, a prominent command-
er with great personal authority. Hamid 
developed from a simple car mechanic to a 
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rebel commander in 2011, to a leader of the 
Islamist-affiliated LSF, and then to a leader 
of the jihadist-oriented coalition of rebel 
militias in the beginning of 2014. Today, he 
heads the BRSC. His adoption of the jihadist 
narrative was a result of AS indoctrination 
of him and his fighters, as the relationship 
between AS and Hamid has been close since 
the 2011 revolution. 
Furthermore, although there are ideo-
logical differences between the jihadists in 
Benghazi and Darna and the MB-affiliated 
parties in Misrata and Tripoli, confronting 
a common enemy in the forces of Haftar 
and the Tobruk-based government means 
that Libyan Islamists might increasingly be 
converging into a homogeneous bloc that 
is likely to be ever more difficult to engage 
with. Already, the prime minister of the 
non-recognized Tripoli-based government, 
Omar al-Hassi, is on record calling AS a 
“simple, beautiful, friendly idea.” 
Within the BRSC, dozens of fighters from 
the AS stronghold of Darna are known to 
have joined the struggle in Benghazi. How-
ever, their form of organization and com-
mand chain are not clear since the BRSC 
was squeezed out of much of the city, while 
few BRSC-controlled pockets still exist in 
some Benghazi neighborhoods. The posi-
tion of the BRSC with regard to AS remains 
unclear since the UN Security Council 
blacklisted the group on 19 November 2014, 
which was followed by a call for actors 
from within the Misrata alliance to dissolve 
the brigade. It is plausible that the BRSC 
will go along with this position and de-
nounce AS in public while continuing to 
harbor them for the sake of their common 
interest in the battle over Benghazi. Simi-
larly, the Tripoli government can also be 
expected not only to continue its political 
support for AS as a major element of the 
BRSC, but also to cooperate with the jihadists 
in Darna in order to maintain a firm base 
in the east. This would allow it to simulta-
neously fight Haftar and the Tobruk-based 
government, preventing either of them 
from striking out further west. 
Revolutionary and Islamist Forces 
To sum up, all these coalitions started 
out as tactical and temporary measures but 
have led to a convergence of ideological 
positions over time among many of the 
fighters. Alliances throughout the country 
are mostly forged and maintained against 
common enemies, and are hence subject to 
change as the balance of power and tactical 
interests shift. Group loyalties in Libya are 
primarily to factional commanders of dif-
ferent political persuasions or ideologies 
rather than to the state. 
The external support that the BRSC re-
ceives also varies from one group to another. 
Qatar is apparently channeling money and 
weapons through Sudan to the Misrata-led 
operation Libya Dawn. Turkey has stronger 
affiliations with the Libyan MB and hosts 
many of its members. Meetings of GNC rep-
resentatives with Turkish officials are being 
held in Turkey, and fighters from Misrata’s 
Libya Dawn and from the BRSC openly travel 
there for medical treatment. 
Saraya Malek 
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Haftar’s Allies 
Gen. Khalifa Haftar, 72, lived for 20 years 
in exile in the United States after leading a 
failed rebellion against Qaddafi from 1987 
to 1990. Before that, he served in the Libyan 
Army under Qaddafi and had even partici-
pated in the 1969 coup that brought Qad-
dafi to power. In 2011, he returned to Libya 
to join the revolution and emerged as one 
of the prominent commanders on the side 
of the rebels. He was appointed as a field 
commander by the NTC. During his retire-
ment, he first took a stance against the 
Tripoli government and the Chief of Staff in 
a televised statement on 14 February 2014. 
He also proposed a five-point plan to rescue 
the nation: the suspension of the GNC and 
the government, and the establishment of a 
presidential committee and a defense coun-
cil, which he intended to head. He did not 
receive significant support though. 
Three months later, Haftar exploited the 
chaos and tension in Tripoli, where the GNC 
was pressured to dissolve and where tension 
between Zintani and Misratan militias was 
on the rise: He launched air and ground 
assaults against Islamist and revolutionary 
militias in Benghazi under Operation Dig-
nity. In doing so, he formed a rival army 
leadership (the General Leadership of the 
Libyan National Army) against the Chief of 
General Staff of the Libyan Army, and thus 
triggered the split of state institutions. He 
won the support of politicians, diplomats, 
army units, and tribes that wanted him to 
impose order and rein in the country’s rebel-
lious armed groups. The change in support 
for Haftar – from his first attempt in Feb-
ruary to the second in May – suggests that 
although many refused to support his per-
sonal political ambitions, they approved of 
his offensive against the extremist militias, 
which they perceived as a real threat. 
There are three main blocs that joined 
Haftar’s fight. First, there were a number 
of defectors from Libyan Army and police 
units, who were enraged over the govern-
ment’s silence on the assassinations against 
members of the army and angry about their 
forced retirement. Although they had been 
removed because they had reached retire-
ment age, they saw it as another attempt to 
replace them with Islamist and revolution-
ary forces by the GNC. Out of 400 officers 
who had been forcibly retired, 129 declared 
their support to Haftar and were later re-
instated by the newly elected parliament. 
Second, the Benghazi-based Saiqa Forces, 
as well as Air Force units in the east, also 
lent support to Haftar. These were a great 
military asset, especially since the span of 
control of Haftar’s LNA was limited, as its 
units are largely marked by tribal and 
regional loyalties, such as to the al-Obeidat 
and al-Barasa. It is worth noting here, that 
the Saiqa units, although they fight under 
Haftar’s command, are considered loyal 
to Abdullah al-Thini, a former army com-
mander and the prime minister of the 
Tobruk government. 
Third, the Barqa Supreme Military Coun-
cil is an alliance of tribal armed groups 
based in different eastern cities that see 
control over Benghazi as being a key step 
in realizing their federalist ambitions. 
Besides these armed units, Operation 
Dignity is supported by ordinary residents 
of Benghazi who turned to armed struggle 
and formed the so-called Shabab al-Manatiq 
(literary “Districts’ Youth”). When the mili-
tary offensive started, local youths in civilian 
clothes attacked checkpoints set up by the 
BRSC. These groups may pose a future risk 
to stability, as they will eventually demand 
a political reward for their role, which may 
potentially put at risk exactly what Haftar’s 
campaign is aiming to achieve. 
The so-called LNA that Haftar controls 
began with small units of the Libyan Army, 
but since then it controls all the units and 
bases in the eastern region, especially after 
coopting Chief of Staff Abd al-Raziq al-
Nadouri. On the political level, Haftar’s 
forces have been officially endorsed by the 
internationally recognized HoR in Tobruk. 
They have merged, at least partially, with 
the Libyan Army under a mandate from the 
parliament. Yet, political actors in Tobruk 
are evidently harboring second thoughts 
about the ambitions of the general. Rela-
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tions remain ambivalent with al-Thini, who 
had previously accused Haftar of trying to 
stage a coup. The distrust between the two 
men is still palpable, as both claim owner-
ship of the “war on terrorism” in the coun-
try. Furthermore, the lingering bad blood 
between al-Thini and Haftar is a sign of a 
rift between top commanders in the Libyan 
Army. On 5 January 2015, Chief of Staff 
al-Nadouri ordered the arrest of Col. Masoud 
Rahouma, the acting defense minister in 
al-Thini’s government, over an arms ship-
ment that was going to the Saiqa force 
without the knowledge of the Chief of Staff 
or Haftar. Although Saiqa is part of the 
Karama campaign, they have complained 
to the government that Haftar is not pro-
viding its units with enough ammunition, 
leading to the loss of fighters. 
A proposal advanced by Haftar and his 
commanders to unify the military leader-
ship against the BRSC by forming a Su-
preme Military Council, to be headed by 
Haftar himself, further fueled suspicions 
and fell flat due to resistance from inside 
the HoR. Lawmakers were apparently con-
cerned that such a new military body might 
soon seek to sideline the elected parlia-
ment, in particular if it were to be headed 
by Haftar, who has already insinuated that 
he might take charge if the HoR proved 
incapable of performing its duties. Further-
more, after the decision of the HoR to re-
instate 129 officers who had been retired 
by the GNC, many fear that Haftar will 
now feel emboldened to resist any further 
attempts at civilian oversight. 
Another potential crack in the anti-
Islamist camp emerged in December 2014. 
This is when the NFA bloc, HoR members 
from the east, and several members of the 
al-Obeidat tribe (one of the major eastern 
tribes, with lands extending from the Egyp-
tian border to Tobruk and the highlands 
atop Darna) encouraged Major General Sulei-
man Mahmoud al-Obeidi – a senior com-
mander who had likewise been forcibly 
retired by the GNC – to propose an offensive 
in Darna, the jihadist stronghold of the east-
ern region. Since al-Obeidi had previously 
Anti-Islamist Forces 
refused to endorse Haftar, the initiative was 
interpreted as an attempt to prop up addi-
tional military figures that would undermine 
Haftar’s claim to leadership and balance the 
power he had been assembling. The political 
wrangling in the background may also ex-
plain the slow advancement of military 
operations in Benghazi as Haftar attempts 
to weaken cohesion among Saiqa forces, 
which are said to be the least loyal to him. 
On the regional level, Egypt, which views 
the presence of hardline extremists near 
its western border as a direct national secu-
rity threat, has deepened its involvement 
and willingness to offer military support 
to Haftar through the Tobruk-based govern-
ment. Egypt also fears what it sees as a 
mounting threat as a result of the cooper-
ation and alignment of Libya’s MB with 
jihadist networks that had beheaded Egyp-
tian workers. In general, Egypt has sup-
ported the idea that toppling MB or Islamist 
rule would require forming a military coali-
tion with Haftar. Also, competition between 
the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Qatar 
led to continued support of both states to 
opposing sides, with Qatar supporting Mis-
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rata and the Islamists, and the UAE sup-
porting the anti-Islamist current. 
Although what is left of the HoR (some 
125 members) is, for now, united in its sup-
port for the LNA and Operation Dignity, 
before long the different priorities of the 
political factions will probably lead to 
realignments of alliances and differences 
that have the potential to generate conflict 
and further violence. In particular, the NFA 
and Haftar on the one side and the federal-
ists and eastern tribes on the other are 
likely to work at cross-purposes: Although 
the former are striving to reassert their 
position within the framework of a uni-
tarian Libyan state, they do not agree on 
national politics, and the latter have no 
interest in pursuing war in the western 
region. Rather, consolidation of the rival 
government in Tripoli and a progressive 
establishment of parallel administrative 
structures would serve their purpose of 
creating a separate state. 
The most obvious example of the poten-
tial conflict of this configuration thus far 
was the public quarrel between Haftar’s 
deputy, Col. Saqr al-Joroushi, and the com-
mander of the so-called Petroleum Defense 
Guards, Ibrahim Jadhran, who set up the 
Cyrenaica Political Bureau in 2013 and se-
cured control of the eastern oil ports. Amid 
the attacks by the Misrata-led Libya Dawn 
to seize control of the oil ports, Joroushi 
directed a verbal attack against his nominal 
ally Jadhran, calling him a “terrorist.” The 
intolerance of the LNA vis-à-vis groups that 
do not submit to its command demon-
strates the urge to exert maximum control 
over fragmented forces, which is liable to 
lead to multiple violent conflicts with local 
and regional powers and stakeholders. 
Conclusion 
Haftar’s campaign in Benghazi and beyond 
clearly shows the limits of an approach that 
seeks stabilization through military means. 
Empowering and arming additional non-
state actors – such as the Districts’ Youth, 
the federalists, or discontented former secu-
rity personnel – is liable to further increase 
the challenges of (re)establishing any form 
of central state control. Also, even if the cam-
paign were to be successful in its primary 
goal of rolling back and containing jihadist 
and revolutionary militias, divergent inter-
ests and suspicion over potential political 
ambitions of its commander are likely to 
lead to the fracturing of the fragile alliance 
that is currently sustaining the Tobruk-led 
government. In addition, the example of 
the BRSC serves to show that increased mili-
tary pressure will prompt groups with dif-
ferent degrees of ideological commitment 
to close ranks and converge on the more 
radical positions. It might also further con-
solidate the alliance between these groups 
and the Tripoli-based government and is 
liable to empower the most radical currents 
in the latter. Thus, the prospects of restoring 
the political process on the central state 
level will become even more remote, and 
the already strong momentum for the break-
up of the country will be further reinforced. 
To the degree that external actors (such 
as Egypt, the UAE, or Western countries) 
become further involved in the conflict 
(e.g., with aerial attacks on Islamist strong-
holds), eastern Libya may turn into yet 
another theater of conflict that attracts the 
volunteers of international jihadism and 
provides for their radicalization and con-
version into hardened fighters that will 
come to plague the region and Western coun-
tries in the near future. In other words, 
there is a serious concern that Libya is devel-
oping into fertile ground for a repetition of 
the Islamic State scenario in Iraq and Syria. 
Hence, Germany and its European partners 
should play an active role in UN-sponsored 
talks and refrain from supporting actors 
who push for a military solution. Rather, 
they should push for a unity government to 
emerge from the dialogues and assist it in 
stabilizing its rule and asserting its power 
over political decision making. In addition, 
they should play an active role in talks with 
regional actors (Qatar, Turkey, UAE, Egypt) 
and aim at convincing them not to impede 
reconciliation and compromise in Libya. 
© Stiftung Wissenschaft und 
Politik, 2015 
All rights reserved 
These Comments reflect  
solely the author’s views. 
SWP 
Stiftung Wissenschaft und 
Politik 
German Institute for 
International and  
Security Affairs 
Ludwigkirchplatz 3­4 
10719 Berlin 
Telephone  +49 30 880 07-0 
Fax  +49 30 880 07-100 
www.swp-berlin.org 
swp@swp-berlin.org 
ISSN 1861-1761 
SWP Comments 8 
February 2015 
8 
